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1. Introduction 
 According to the teleological conception, reasons are value based. Whether 
someone has reason to φ depends on the value of the result of φ-ing, or the intrinsic 
value of φ-ing itself (Scanlon 1998: 84). Accordingly, on the teleological conception 
of reasons for belief, whether someone has reason to believe some particular 
proposition p on some particular occasion, depends on the value of the result of 
believing p, or the intrinsic value of believing p, on that occasion. Although this basic 
tenet of the teleological account of reasons for belief has seemed plausible to many, 
and a number of attempts have been made at fleshing it out in detail, it remains 
controversial whether it can be made to work.1 
 We can distinguish between two distinct challenges, or broad categories of 
challenges, for the teleological conception of reasons for belief. On the one hand, 
there is the problem of explaining why, on the teleological account, one couldn’t have 
reason to believe a proposition that is not supported by evidence. If reasons for belief 
are reasons that obtain in virtue of the value of the relevant belief, why does the 
pleasantness (or some other non-epistemic property of value) of believing a particular 
                                                
1 For prominent examples, see Bonjour (1985), Foley (1987), Lehrer (1990), Goldman (1999), Lynch 
(2004), Alston (2005). 
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proposition not provide a reason for holding it? There are those, of course, who accept 
the possibility of such non-epistemic reasons for belief.2 But many teleologists about 
reasons for belief wish to maintain that one can have reason to believe a proposition 
only insofar as the belief is evidentially supported, or has some other epistemic 
property, depending on the specific account. We can call this ‘the exclusivity 
problem’ for teleologists. The problem is that of explaining why only certain 
properties of value, namely the epistemic ones, can count in favour of beliefs, if 
reasons are generally a matter of the relevant actions or attitudes resulting in or 
promoting something of value. I have argued in previous papers that a teleological 
conception of reasons for belief is compatible with there only being epistemic reasons 
for belief, and I shall simply assume in the following that this is the case.3 
The second major challenge for the teleological account concerns the nature of 
epistemic reasons specifically, regardless of whether such reasons are somehow 
privileged in supporting beliefs. The problem is that of explaining how epistemic 
reasons could be value-based in the first place. If epistemic reasons for belief are 
reasons that obtain in virtue of the epistemic properties of the beliefs that they 
support, a teleological conception must explain epistemic reasons in terms of the 
value, whether intrinsic or derived, of those epistemic properties. But as witnessed by 
the latest decades of theorising about this question, it is all but clear how or why 
epistemic properties are valuable or conducive to something of value, in a sense that 
is sufficiently general to form the basis of a teleological account of epistemic 
                                                
2 See Reisner (2008) and (2009) for a recent discussion and defence of the idea of non-epistemic 
reasons for belief. 
3 See Steglich-Petersen (2006a), (2006b), and (2009). 
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reasons.4 This is the challenge I address in this paper. In the following, I shall call it 
‘the value problem’ for teleological accounts of epistemic reasons.5 
The most common approach to the value problem accepts the basic premise of 
the challenge, namely that if the teleological account is to succeed, epistemic 
properties must somehow be of value, or be conducive to something of value, in some 
general sense. Accordingly, the common approach attempts to solve the problem by 
locating the epistemic properties of value, and explaining the sense in which they are 
valuable. A candidate account might hold, for example, that true beliefs are of 
intrinsic value, and that any property of beliefs that ensures or makes it likely that a 
belief is true (such as the property of being evidential supported or being the result of 
a reliable mechanism) therefore is valuable as well.6 However, in spite of intensive 
efforts, this strategy has not yet reached a widely accepted solution.  
In this paper, I explore the prospects of a slightly different strategy in solving 
the value problem for the teleological account of epistemic reasons. The starting point 
of the strategy is to concede the main criticism of teleological accounts of epistemic 
reasons, namely that epistemic properties (whatever the relevant epistemic properties 
might be) are not valuable generally and in all contexts, and that a teleological 
account relying on such a claim therefore fails. So the question becomes if a 
teleological explanation of epistemic reasons, which doesn’t rely on that claim, is 
available. I will introduce and motivate such an account.  
At the core of the account lies a distinction between two different kinds of 
reasons concerning beliefs, namely reasons to form beliefs that particular propositions 
                                                
4 For a recent discussion of representative proponents of this line of explanation, see Grimm (2008). 
5 The value problem for a teleological account of epistemic reasons is distinct from several other so-
called ‘value problems’ in epistemology, most notably the problem of explaining the value of 
knowledge as opposed to mere true belief. For a survey of recent work on this problem, see Pritchard 
(2007). 
6 For this particular account, see Lynch (2004). 
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are true, i.e. epistemic reasons, and reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions 
or subject matters. I shall argue that the latter kind of reasons is connected to value in 
a straightforward way: whether one has reason to form beliefs about some proposition 
or subject matter is determined by the value of doing so, in the same way reasons for 
actions seem determined by the intrinsic or derived value of those actions. I shall 
argue further that the two kinds of reasons stand in a certain systematic relationship to 
each other that any theory of those reasons must explain. To anticipate, epistemic 
reasons to believe that p entail that one ought to believe that p only in the context of 
an all things considered reason to form a belief about p. I then go on to provide a 
teleological account of this relationship. I shall argue that the relationship can be 
explained by supposing that having an epistemic reason to believe that p is equivalent 
to having what I term a ‘hypothetical instrumental reason’. The main virtue of the 
account is that it does not require the epistemic properties underlying epistemic 
reasons to be of value in all contexts. Only if one has reason to form beliefs about the 
relevant subject matter do epistemic properties of some potential belief about that 
subject matter become valuable, and since one can have epistemic reason to believe 
some proposition without having reason to form beliefs about that proposition, 
epistemic reasons can obtain without the epistemic properties in question being of 
value. 
 
2. Definitions 
 To fix matters, it will be useful to begin by clarifying what I shall mean by a 
number of central notions. First of all, we need to clarify the notion of a ‘reason’. By 
a ‘reason’, I shall mean a fact or consideration that stands in a reason-giving relation 
to some particular action or attitude of some particular agent (Scanlon 1998: 17). The 
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reason-giving relation can take different forms, depending on the kind of reason. 
Generally, the relation is that of favouring the relevant action or attitude, so a reason 
to φ is something that somehow favours φ-ing. But there are different kinds or 
‘grades’ of favouring. Some reasons may by themselves require φ-ing, i.e. make it the 
case that one ought to φ. Such reasons are sometimes called ‘perfect reasons’ 
(Broome 2004), but I shall instead call them ‘all things considered reasons’. Other 
reasons may favour φ-ing in a mere ‘pro tanto’ way. Such reasons can usefully be 
thought of as considerations that can play a role in a weighing-explanation of what 
one ought to do, where the weight of several pro tanto reasons are compared to reach 
a judgment about what one overall ought to do in a given situation (Broome 2004). So 
having a pro tanto reason to φ does not necessarily entail that one ought to φ. There 
might be other pro tanto reasons not to φ, or to do something else that excludes φ-ing, 
which weigh heavier than one’s reason to φ. This being said, the distinction between 
all things considered reasons and pro tanto reasons should not be understood to 
sharply. Sometimes a pro tanto reason to φ by itself make it the case that one ought to 
φ – for example in case there are no opposing reasons not to φ. In that case, the pro 
tanto reason to φ is an all things considered reason as well. Moreover, what we treat 
as all things considered reasons are often in fact the result of weighing several pro 
tanto reasons for and against the relevant action. The distinction is thus somewhat 
blurry, and I agree with those who regard the notion of all things considered reasons 
as derivative of the notion of pro tanto reasons (Broome 2004). Nevertheless, the 
distinction is useful.7 
                                                
7 Some have suggested that there are reasons that merely ‘entice’, i.e. make it the case that φ-ing would 
be attractive for the agent, without thereby implying that the agent would commit a mistake or 
otherwise be in the wrong if he fails to respond to it (Dancy 2004). For a discussion relating these 
different kinds of reasons to evidence, see Steglich-Petersen (2008b). 
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 For reasons that will emerge later in the paper, it will be useful to represent 
these relationships between reasons and corresponding oughts-statements as 
conditionals, having reason-statements as antecedents and statements about what an 
agent ought to do in the appropriate sense as consequents: 
 
 Necessarily, if S has all things considered reason to φ, then S ought to φ.8 
 
Necessarily, if S has pro tanto reason to φ, then, in the absence of opposing 
reasons, S ought to φ. 
 
Different kinds of reasons can thus be distinguished, at least in part, by the 
kinds of ought-statements they entail. In investigating a class of reasons, part of what 
we are interested in is the kind of ought-statement entailed by that class of reasons, 
i.e. in what sense the reason in question favours the relevant action or attitude. As the 
case of pro tanto reasons shows, reasons do not always entail unqualified oughts, but 
only more complex or conditional statements including oughts. This shall become 
important later on when investigating the nature of epistemic reasons, where it is all 
but clear in what sense they favour or make it the case that one ought to form the 
relevant belief. 
Although the teleological account of reasons might be committed to certain 
characteristics of the favouring relation that reasons can stand in,9 it is primarily an 
account of another aspect of reasons, namely of the kinds of considerations or facts 
                                                
8 ‘Necessarily’ indicates that the relevant conditional is that of entailment rather than a contingent 
relation. Whenever not explicitly mentioned otherwise, I shall take ‘if’ to stand for the material 
conditional. 
9 For example, it is sometimes argued that teleological accounts of reasons are committed to the view 
that all reasons can be compared and weighed against each other. For this view, see in particular Joseph 
Raz (1986). 
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that are able to constitute reasons, and thus stand in the favouring relation to actions 
or attitudes in the first place. According to the teleological account, some fact or 
consideration can be reason for an action or attitude only in virtue of being a fact or 
consideration about the value, intrinsic or derived, of the action or attitude that it 
favours. For example, the fact that an action promotes wellbeing is a reason to 
perform it, since wellbeing is valuable. 
Finally, by ‘epistemic reasons’, I shall refer to considerations that count in 
favour of holding a belief in a particular proposition solely on account of that 
(potential) belief’s epistemic properties. In this paper I wish to remain neutral on the 
exact nature of the epistemic properties giving rise to epistemic reasons, but by 
‘epistemic properties’ I shall generally mean properties that are in some way relevant 
to whether or not the proposition believed is true. On this very general definition, 
being evidentially supported is the most obvious candidate for an epistemic property, 
but I shall not exclude other candidates in advance. 
 
3. Epistemic reasons and value 
With this rough characterisation of reasons, and the teleological account of 
these, we can go on to consider the teleological account of epistemic reasons 
specifically. According to the common version of this account, epistemic reasons for 
beliefs obtain in virtue of the value, either intrinsic or instrumental, of the epistemic 
properties of the beliefs they support. When I have an epistemic reason for a 
particular belief, the belief must have some epistemic property that somehow 
constitutes or promotes something of value. On the teleological account, epistemic 
reasons thus share an important characteristic with practical reasons: they both 
support actions or attitudes in virtue of those actions or attitudes promoting or 
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constituting something of value. What distinguishes epistemic reasons is that the 
valuable property of beliefs, which the reason is based on, is an epistemic property, 
such as being true, supported by evidence, etc., depending on the specific teleological 
account. This means that the teleologian must explain why those epistemic properties 
are valuable or promote something of value. 
Critics often point out that beliefs supported by epistemic reasons do not 
thereby become valuable or come to promote something of value. If epistemic reasons 
for beliefs are reasons that obtain in virtue of the relevant beliefs having some 
epistemic property that is of value or promotes something of value, then all beliefs 
supported by epistemic reasons must be valuable or value promoting. But not all 
beliefs supported by epistemic reasons are valuable or value promoting. In fact, some 
beliefs are just the opposite, despite being supported by epistemic reasons. Numerous 
examples of such beliefs have been given in the literature. Most of them invoke 
propositional contents that it would be trivial or even harmful to form beliefs about, 
but are nonetheless supported by epistemic reasons. To give but a few recent 
examples: Thomas Kelly (2003) asks us to imagine being about to watch a suspense 
thriller. In that case, most of us would prefer not having epistemically supported 
beliefs about the ending of the movie, since our enjoyment of it hinges at least in part 
on not knowing the ending. Alvin Goldman (1999) and Stephen Grimm (2008) offer 
several examples of propositions that it wouldn’t be outright value-detracting, but 
nevertheless worthless to form beliefs about: What is the 323rd entry in the Wichita, 
Kansas phone directory? Is there an even number of dust specks on my desk? Such 
cases seem to show that epistemic reasons for beliefs do not depend on the value of 
those beliefs. A belief can be true, justified, warranted, supported by evidence, etc., 
without thereby becoming either intrinsically valuable, or conducive to something of 
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intrinsic value. A world in which I have a true, warranted belief about the number of 
dust specks on my desk is not better than a world in which I have no such belief. A 
world in which I have a true, warranted belief about the ending of a suspense-thriller I 
am about to watch is actively worse, certainly from the perspective of my own aims, 
but arguably also intrinsically, than a world in which I have no such belief. Epistemic 
evaluation of beliefs thus seems entirely independent from questions of value. 
It may well seem fantastic to claim that epistemic reasons do not depend on 
the value of the beliefs that they support. Surely, a warranted belief is more valuable 
than an unwarranted one; surely, a true belief is more valuable than a false one. But if 
the above criticism of the teleological account is sound, that is the conclusion we are 
driven to accept. Although it often is the case that a warranted belief is valuable, no 
general claim of that sort seems available. It is always possible to find 
counterexamples involving epistemically supported beliefs in very trivial 
propositions, or propositions that the believer would be better off not having beliefs 
about.10 
There are two common strategies for averting this objection against the 
teleological account. Some defenders of the teleological account have tried to avert it 
by attempting to show that epistemic reasons, despite appearances, do indicate that 
the relevant beliefs are somehow valuable. Michael Lynch (2004) insists, for 
example, that epistemically well-founded beliefs (in his case, true beliefs), about even 
extremely trivial or inconsequential matters are valuable, since we value truth in its 
own right. The main problem with this view is that it seems implausible to claim it 
worthwhile or valuable to form beliefs about trivial matters such as those mentioned 
                                                
10 Something not often noted is that the value-independence of epistemic reasons, if true, would be just 
as puzzling for non-teleological accounts. How can any reason, let alone teleological ones, be entirely 
independent of value? Some have suggested that reasons for belief are instead generated by a special 
constitutive non-teleological norm governing belief (Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005). For 
criticism of this view, see Steglich-Petersen (2006a; 2008a). 
 10 
above. Others teleologians recognise that some epistemically well-founded beliefs 
aren’t valuable, but attempt to salvage the teleological account by restricting 
epistemic reasons to support beliefs that are of interest.11 But this strategy undermines 
the basic tenet of the teleological explanation of epistemic reasons. If epistemic 
reasons obtain in virtue of the relevant beliefs having valuable epistemic properties, 
then beliefs without valuable epistemic properties cannot be supported by epistemic 
reasons. But it seems that even extremely trivial and uninteresting beliefs can be 
supported by epistemic reasons. However uninteresting, it is possible to have an 
epistemically well-supported belief that there is an even number of dust specks on my 
desk. Although I cannot argue for this claim in full here, it thus seems that both 
common strategies in salvaging the teleological account are in trouble.12 13 
In the following, I propose to accept that epistemic reasons can obtain 
independently of the value, whether intrinsic or derived, of the beliefs that they 
support. My belief that the suspense-thriller I am about to watch ends in a particular 
way can be epistemically unassailable, entirely underwritten by epistemic reason, 
even if it would be better from a value perspective if I hadn’t had that belief. 
Likewise, my belief that there is an even number of dust specks on my desk can be 
well-supported by epistemic reasons, even if nothing of value would be promoted by 
forming such a belief. Nevertheless, I will argue that there is a broadly teleological 
account compatible with these claims. 
 
4. Two kinds of reasons for belief 
                                                
11 This strategy is adopted by, for example, Goldman (1999) and Alston (2004). 
12 For a more thorough recent criticism of these two strategies along the same lines, see Grimm (2008). 
13 If epistemic and practical values could be weighed against each other, these problems would have an 
easy solution: in all of the mentioned cases, the epistemic value of the relevant belief is outweighed by 
some competing practical value. It is doubtful, however, whether such weighing is possible. For further 
discussion, see Reisner (2008) and Steglich-Petersen (2009). 
 11 
Normally, reasons for belief are taken to be reasons for believing that some 
particular proposition, or body of propositions, is true. But this is not the only kind of 
reasons relating to beliefs. Another important class of reasons for belief are the 
reasons we might have to form or have beliefs about particular propositions, or sets of 
propositions. When one has reason to form a belief about some proposition p, one has 
reason to form a belief as to whether p is true or not. These two kinds of reasons are 
clearly independent of each other in the sense that neither entails the other in regard to 
some particular proposition. Having reason to form a belief about or as to whether p 
does not entail having a reason to believe that p, nor vice versa. I can have reason to 
form a belief as to whether the Americans landed a man on the Moon, without having 
reason to believe that they did in fact land a man on the Moon. For example, I might 
expect to be met with that question in a quiz, but not yet have any evidence 
concerning it. On the other hand, I can have reason to believe that there is an even 
number of dist specs on my desk (in the sense of having the relevant evidence), 
without thereby having any reason to form a belief about that proposition. I might be 
completely uninterested in the matter, and with good reason. 
The notion of reasons to form beliefs about propositions or subject matters is 
in some respects similar to the notion of having a reason to engage in inquiry, i.e. a 
reason to actively pursue evidence bearing on a certain proposition or subject matter. 
There are important differences, however. For one thing, reasons to form beliefs about 
propositions are more general than reasons to engage in inquiry in regard to those 
propositions. It may be that reasons of the former kind entail reasons of the latter 
kind, i.e. that one has reason to engage in inquiry about some subject matter whenever 
one has reason to form beliefs about it. But that does not make them identical. 
Another reason to not simply treat them as identical is that doing so would exclude in 
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advance the possibility of practical reasons for belief, which one might find an 
altogether too swift argument against this possibility. 
Most importantly for our purposes, reasons to form beliefs about propositions 
seem value-driven in a relatively straightforward sense. Whether one has reason to 
form a belief about a particular subject matter depends on the value, whether intrinsic 
or derived, of having a belief about that subject matter. Clearly, the reasons can be 
grounded on a multitude of values. There is nothing to suggest that a single value, or 
category of values, should govern such reasons. They may be based on personal 
interest or curiosity. Arguably, my interest in road cycling gives me reason to form 
beliefs about the latest developments in Tour de France, while those without such 
interests have little or no reason to form such beliefs. In other cases, the reasons might 
be independent of personal interests, and even be universal in nature. Even if I have 
little personal interest in Danish politics, it is arguably my duty as a Danish citizen to 
exercise my democratic rights by voting, and thus to form beliefs about subject 
matters that are relevant to making an informed decision. At a more general level, we 
might all have a duty to form beliefs about the ways in which our actions affect 
others, the environment, or other common goods. The reasons may also be purely 
instrumental, as when we have reason to form the beliefs necessary to achieve goods 
of various sorts. 
Another characteristic of reasons to form beliefs about propositions or subject 
matters is that they come in degrees of weight or importance. Although I have reason 
to form beliefs now about the latest developments in Tour de France, there might be 
other and more urgent matters I have more reason to form beliefs about. As such, 
reasons to form beliefs about propositions can be compared and weighed against other 
such reasons in the usual ways. In cases where I have equal reason to form beliefs 
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about two alternative propositions or subject matters, and cannot form beliefs about 
both (I might have limited time to find out about the subject matters), I am rationally 
permitted to choose either of the two options. Reasons to form beliefs about 
propositions may also be weighed against practical reasons. It is not uncommon for 
reasons to form beliefs about subject matters to compete with practical reasons, since 
finding out about subject matters takes time and resources that could otherwise be 
devoted to other practical pursuits. In such cases, the value of forming the relevant 
beliefs must be weighed against the value of pursuing the competing practical 
pursuits.14 
These are all characteristics that set reasons to form or have beliefs about 
propositions apart from epistemic reasons to believe that some particular propositions 
is true. Whether I have epistemic reason to believe a particular proposition depends 
on the epistemic properties of that (potential) belief only, and these properties are 
entirely unaffected by the interest I may or may not have in that proposition, the 
moral or instrumental worth of believing the proposition, or any other such value 
giving property.  
As such, the weighing of epistemic reasons with other epistemic reasons is 
entirely different in nature from the weighing of reasons to form beliefs about 
propositions or subject matters. In a paper not otherwise devoted to the nature of 
epistemic reasons, Jonathan Dancy observes the following: 
One of the most striking differences between theoretical and practical 
rationality is that if I have sufficient practical reason for more than one 
option […] I am rationally permitted to choose any of them, so long as 
they are roughly equally supported. By contrast, if I have sufficient and 
equally good reason for each of a set of alternative beliefs, I am not 
rationally permitted to choose any of them in preference to the others. 
(Dancy 2004: 95). 
                                                
14 For a detailed discussion of the way reasons to form beliefs may be weighed against each other, and 
against practical reasons, see Steglich-Petersen (2009). 
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To illustrate the point I take Dancy to make, consider first a case in which you 
have sufficient practical reason for two alternative options that cannot both be 
pursued. For example, the fact that it would be fun to spend the afternoon playing 
crocket is a reason to do so; on the other hand, the fact that it would be pleasant to go 
swimming is a reason to pursue that option instead. In the absence of defeating 
reasons, both considerations provide sufficient reason, and they support the options 
with roughly equal weight. In that case, one is permitted to choose either. But 
consider now a case where you have roughly equal epistemic reason to hold each of 
two alternative beliefs, such that both cannot rationally be held at the same time. For 
simplicity, we might suppose that you have evidence for both p and not-p, that the 
two bodies of evidence support the truth of the relevant propositions to roughly the 
same degree, and that either body of evidence would have been sufficient to hold the 
relevant belief in the absence of any other evidence bearing on the matter. In this case, 
one is not permitted to hold either belief. The two epistemic reasons defeat each other, 
rather than make either option permissible. This difference between practical and 
epistemic reasons is easy to miss, because reasons of both kinds can outweigh reasons 
of the same kind, in case they support their relative options to a greater degree that the 
competing reasons. The difference only shows up in cases where there is (roughly) 
equal reason to pursue either of two alternative options, or hold either of two 
alternative beliefs. 
With these initial characterisations in place, we can explore, in a loose and 
tentative way, the relationship between reasons for having beliefs about some 
proposition or subject matter, and epistemic reasons for believing that particular 
propositions are true. It has already been noted that reasons of neither kind entail 
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reasons of the other. But we now need to explore how the two kinds of reasons rely 
upon each other in determining what one ought to believe. 
First consider the situation in which S has an all things considered reason to 
form beliefs about some subject matter. Suppose, for example, that S is a registered 
voter, and that much is at stake in the election. In that case, it is plausible that S has 
all things considered reason to form beliefs about the policies of the Presidential 
candidates. This in itself is not sufficient to make it the case that S ought to believe 
particular propositions about the policies of the respective candidates, for example 
that one candidate is in favour of universal healthcare. If S has no evidence 
concerning that candidate’s healthcare policy, it seems plausible that S shouldn’t 
believe any particular propositions on that topic (or only extremely trivial ones, such 
as the proposition that it is the case of the candidate’s healthcare policy that S has no 
evidence concerning it). So having all things considered reason to form a belief about 
p does not in itself entail that one ought to believe either that p or not-p.  But suppose 
that S acquires sufficient evidence, and thus an epistemic reason to believe that the 
candidate indeed is in favour of universal healthcare. In that case, it seems that S 
ought to form the belief that the candidate is in favour of universal healthcare. 
Consider next the case where S has no reason to form beliefs about some 
proposition or subject matter. Suppose, for example, that the subject matter is whether 
there is an even number of dust specks on S’s desk. Let us also suppose that S has 
excellent evidence, and thus epistemic reason to believe in the sense defined, that 
there indeed is an even number of dust specks on his desk. In spite of this epistemic 
reason, it does not seem to be the case that S ought to form the belief that there is an 
even number of dust specks on her desk. It may be that S as a matter of fact cannot 
avoid forming that belief, since we are psychologically disposed to form beliefs that 
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are supported by consciously considered evidence. But it is nonetheless not the case 
that S ought to form that belief. If S failed to form the belief, we wouldn’t fault him or 
regard him as normatively worse off for that reason.15 We may regret that S’s general 
psychological disposition did not make him form the belief, since more often than not, 
it is desirable to be disposed to form beliefs in accordance with the available 
evidence. But we would not regard S as having failed to do something he ought to 
have done. Nevertheless, S has epistemic reason to believe the relevant proposition. 
So one may have overall epistemic reason to believe that p without it being the case 
that one ought to believe that p.16 If, on the other hand, a belief about the number of 
dust specks should become valuable for S (an eccentric billionaire might give him a 
prize for forming a belief about that proposition17), thus giving rise to an all things 
considered reason to form a belief as to whether the content is true, this, together with 
the epistemic reason, would mean that S ought to believe that there is an even number 
of dust specks on his desk. 
So far, then, the following relationships hold. If S has epistemic reason to 
believe that p, S is such that, if he has all things considered reason to form beliefs 
about or as to whether p, then he ought to believe that p. If the latter conditional is 
false (which it is just in case the antecedent is true and the consequent is false), it is 
also false that S has epistemic reason to believe that p. In other words, if it is not the 
case of S that having a reason to form beliefs about p materially implies that he ought 
to believe that p, we may deduce that S does not have epistemic reason to believe that 
p.  
                                                
15 For further arguments to the effect that one cannot derive a normative conclusion from the fact that 
we are psychologically disposed to form beliefs in accordance with our consciously considered 
evidence, see Steglich-Petersen (2006a) and Dretske (2000). 
16 For further defence of this claim, see Steglich-Petersen (2008b). 
17 Since the billionaire does not require you to adopt a belief that a particular proposition is true, but 
only a belief as to whether the proposition is true, this example does not raise problems concerning the 
possibility of practical reasons for belief. 
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The same holds for reasons to form beliefs about or as to whether p. If S has 
all things considered reason to form beliefs about p, S is such that, if he has epistemic 
reason to believe that p, S ought to believe that p. If the latter conditional is false 
(which it is just in case the antecedent is true and the consequent is false), it is also 
false that S has reason for form beliefs about p. In other words, if it is not the case of 
S that having epistemic reason to believe that p materially implies that he ought to 
believe that p, we may deduce that S does not have all things considered reason to 
form beliefs about p. These relationships can thus be summed up as follows (where 
‘T’ stands for ‘belief that’ and ‘A’ stands for ‘belief about’): 
 
(T) Necessarily, if S has epistemic reason to believe that p, then [if S has all things 
considered reason to form a belief about p, S ought to believe that p] 
 
(A) Necessarily, if S has all things considered reason to form a belief about p, then 
[if S has epistemic reason to believe that p, S ought to believe that p]18 
 
It is important to make clear that these schemas are not intended as analyses or 
definitions of the respective kinds of reasons. The schemas merely state certain 
complex relationships between reasons to form beliefs about propositions, epistemic 
reasons to believe propositions, and whether an agent ought to form a particular 
belief. As such, the schemas are compatible with the truth of a number of other claims 
about the relationship between these three conditions, some of which may be stronger 
than the ones focused on here. As indicated by the above discussion, however, the 
schemas do describe what appear to be fundamental properties of these two kinds of 
                                                
18 Of course, in both schemas, the necessity operator attaches to the main connective only, and thus not 
to the embedded conditional. Part of the upshot of the above discussion is that reasons of neither kind 
ever on their own entail that one ought to form the relevant belief.  
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reasons. Furthermore, the schemas are quite permissive in a number of ways. For one 
thing, they leave open the details as to what it takes to have a reason to form a belief 
about some subject matter, and what epistemic properties some potential belief that p 
must have in order to make it the case that one has epistemic reason to believe that p. 
Perhaps more importantly, the schemas are silent as to whether there could be non-
epistemic reasons to believe that p. I mentioned at the outset that I would simply 
assume in this paper that some version of evidentialism is true, but nothing in these 
schemas exclude that it could be the case that one ought to believe that p in the 
absence of an epistemic reason. As mentioned, I take it to be a separate problem to 
explain the exclusivity of epistemic reasons, and I have dealt with it elsewhere (see 
footnote 3). 
Since this paper is primarily about epistemic reasons, I will now leave schema 
(A) aside, and focus on schema (T), stating a necessary conditional with a statement 
about epistemic reasons as the antecedent. This schema can be altered and qualified in 
various ways to take into account a number of subtleties. For example, one might find 
it plausible that the normative force of the reason one has to form beliefs about some 
subject matter carries over to the ought-statement concerning belief in a particular 
proposition, on the condition that one has epistemic reason for believing that 
proposition. For example, consider two mutually independent propositions p and q, 
where p is of great significance and q is of lower significance to the believer, such 
that one has an all things considered reason to form a belief about p and a mere weak 
pro tanto reason to form a belief about q. Suppose further that one has evidence of 
identical strength regarding the truth of the two propositions, and thus equal epistemic 
reason to believe either. Despite the equally strong epistemic reasons, it seems that the 
ought-statement concerning belief that p should be stronger than that concerning 
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belief that q. In particular, it seems that in the case of p, it is entailed that one ought to 
believe it, while in the case of q it is merely entailed that one ought to believe it in the 
absence of opposing reasons (these differences are analogous to the explanation of all 
things considered reasons and pro tanto reasons set out in Section 2). So the force of 
the ought-statement concerning belief in particular propositions depends on the force 
of the reasons to form beliefs about those propositions, and not on the force of the 
epistemic reasons one has for believing those propositions. Indeed, it is doubtful 
whether epistemic reasons have normative ‘force’ or ‘weight’ in that sense at all. 
When we speak of the ‘force’ or ‘weight’ of epistemic reasons, we usually have in 
mind a different quality, namely the degree to which the evidence, which the 
epistemic reasons depend upon, confirms the relevant proposition. But this only 
affects the degree of belief one should adopt in that proposition, not the force of the 
ought-statement concerning the formation of the relevant belief. If this is plausible, 
the schema might be qualified in the following way, where the inserted parentheses 
indicate that the degree of belief one ought to adopt is determined by the epistemic 
reason, and the split of the schema into two, corresponding to pro tanto reasons and 
all things considered reasons respectively, indicates that the normative force of the 
ought-statement concerning belief in a particular proposition is determined by the 
reason one has to form beliefs about that proposition: 
 
(T – all things considered)  
Necessarily, if S has epistemic reason to believe that p (to degree D), then [if S 
has all things considered reason to form a belief about p, S ought to believe 
that p (to degree D)]. 
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(T – pro tanto) 
Necessarily, if S has epistemic reason to believe that p (to degree D), then [if S 
has a pro tanto reason to form a belief about p, then, in the absence of 
opposing reasons, S ought to believe that p (to degree D)]. 
 
However, in the following I will ignore these qualifications of schema (T), and 
focus on the initial simple version of (T) only. The important thing for our purposes is 
that the schema specifies a precise sense in which epistemic reasons for some belief 
are related to the value of having that belief. If reasons for forming beliefs about 
propositions are value-driven, then epistemic reasons are value-driven too, in the 
sense that they entail that one ought to believe particular propositions in the context of 
a value-driven reason only. Pointing out this dependence of epistemic reasons on 
values is a significant step towards solving the value problem for the teleological 
account of epistemic reasons. It is not in itself, however, sufficient. What is still 
missing is an explanation of why this dependence holds. 
 
5. A teleological explanation of the relationship 
 The teleological explanation to be offered in this section is a version of the 
instrumentalist account of epistemic reasons. According to one influential version of 
this account, epistemic reasons are a species of standard instrumental reasons. 
Roughly, S has instrumental reason to φ if and only if there is some aim that S has 
reason to pursue, and φ-ing is the best available way (or a step in the best available 
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way) of realising that aim.19 For example, if I have reason to go to London, and going 
to the airport is a step in the best available way of going to London, I have 
instrumental reason to go to the airport. The standard analogous instrumentalist 
explanation of epistemic reasons proceeds roughly as follows. First it is observed that 
forming a belief involves having a particular aim, for example that the belief is true or 
amounts to knowledge.20 So if S has reason to form a belief about p, S has reason to 
pursue the aim involved with forming a belief about p, i.e. believing the truth 
concerning p, or coming to know whether p, depending on the specific account. This 
means that one has instrumental reason to believe that p just in case one has reason to 
form a belief about p, and believing p is the best way to realise the aim involved with 
forming such a belief. Finally, it is pointed out that the conditions under which 
believing p is instrumental or conducive to the aim involved with forming a belief 
about p, coincide with the conditions under which one has epistemic reason to believe 
that p, thus making it plausible to regard epistemic reasons as a special case of 
instrumental reasons. 
 As already pointed out, however, this simple instrumentalist explanation is 
flawed since epistemic reasons do not depend in such a straightforward sense on 
reasons for forming the relevant beliefs, and thus for adopting the putative aim 
involved with forming those beliefs. I can have an epistemic reason to believe that 
there is an even number of dust specks on my desk, regardless of whether I have 
                                                
19 Although this rough account will be sufficient for our purposes, the question of how to correctly 
understand instrumental reasons is a subtle and much debated issue. For representative strands of the 
recent debate, see Wallace (2001), Schroeder (2004), and Broome (2007). 
20 I am ignoring here certain subtleties concerning how to best phrase the claim that beliefs have a 
constitutive aim. In particular, one has to ensure that the term ‘belief’ does not appear in the statement 
of such an aim, since the aim is part of what beliefs are supposed to consist of, thus making such a 
statement uninformative. One way of ensuring this would be state the aim in terms of the more general 
notion of ‘acceptance’. For example, believing p might be identified with the attitude of accepting p 
with the aim of thereby accepting a truth. For more on this account, see Velleman (2000) and Steglich-
Petersen (2006a). 
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reason to form a belief about that matter in the first place. So a straight assimilation 
between epistemic reasons and instrumental reasons is not available. 
However, there is a different sense of instrumental reasons to which epistemic 
reasons might be assimilated instead. This is the purely hypothetical sense of 
instrumental reasons that we have to pursue hypothetical aims, regardless of whether 
or not we in fact have those aims, or have reason to pursue those aims. For example, 
regardless of whether I have reason to go to London, I am such that if I have reason to 
go to London, then I ought to go to the airport. Countless such conditional statements 
are true of each of us all the time, corresponding to all of the instrumental actions to 
hypothetical aims that are available to us. For each of the endless number of 
hypothetical aims I might adopt, there will be a number of available actions that are 
instrumental to that aim. Once again, we can characterise this kind of reasons in terms 
of a conditional statement (where ‘HI’ stands for ‘hypothetical instrumental reason’): 
 
(HI) Necessarily, if S has hypothetical instrumental reason to φ in pursuit of aim A, 
then [if S has all things considered reason to pursue aim A, S ought to φ]. 
 
Once again, this conditional does not amount to an analysis or a definition of 
hypothetical instrumental reasons, but merely states an important relationship 
between such reasons, all things considered reasons, and ought-statements. A number 
of qualifications and comments are needed. The first concern the possibility of 
competing instrumental reasons to pursue the same aim. Often there will be several 
ways to achieve the same aim, so one cannot infer from the fact that there is 
instrumental reason for S to φ in order to achieve A, to it being the case that S 
instrumentally ought to φ, since there might be a stronger instrumental reason to ψ, if 
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ψ-ing is an overall better way of achieving A. So in the above schema, ‘S has 
hypothetical instrumental reason to φ in pursuit of aim A’ should be understood as 
indicating an overall hypothetical instrumental reason, i.e. that φ-ing is the best 
available way to pursue A. Under this assumption it might be observed that the 
normative force attaching to the consequent ought-statement carries over from the 
normative force of the reason for pursuing the relevant aim: if the reason for pursuing 
the relevant aim is a mere pro tanto reason, the consequent ought-statement should be 
qualified to state that S ought to φ in the absence of opposing reasons not to pursue 
aim A. Finally, a comment is needed to dispel any worries about the scope of the 
consequent ought in the embedded conditional. In discussions about instrumental 
rationality, i.e. the rationality of taking the means to one’s aims, it is often assumed 
that instrumental rationality gives rise to wide-scope oughts, rather than a narrow-
scope ones. On the narrow-scope account, if S has some aim A, and φ-ing is necessary 
in pursuing A, S ought to φ. But this has the counterintuitive result that one ought to 
take the means to aims that one does not have reason to pursue. For example, if an 
arsonist has the aim of burning down his neighbour’s house, he ought to pour some 
gasoline on it if that is necessary to burn down the house. Proponents of the wide-
scope account suggest instead that the central demand of instrumental rationality 
should be phrased in terms of an ought that takes the entire conditional as its scope, in 
the following way: S ought to ensure that if S has aim A, and φ-ing is necessary in 
pursuing A, S φs. According to wide-scopers, this avoids the counterintuitive result 
since it is silent as to whether one should comply with it by giving up the aim, or by 
taking the means to it. Given this, however, it should be clear that none of these 
worries are relevant to the above schema concerning hypothetical instrumental 
reasons. In the schema, the embedded conditional moves from S having an all things 
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considered reason to pursue A, to it being the case that S ought to take the means. So 
it never demands that one take the means to an aim one does not have reason to 
pursue. 
With this explication of hypothetical instrumental reasons in place, we can 
return to the issue of epistemic reasons. If we interpret reasons to form beliefs about 
propositions as reasons to pursue a certain aim involved with believing (for the 
present purposes we need only identify this as the aim of forming a belief as to 
whether some proposition is true), and interpret believing particular propositions as 
ways of pursuing that aim, such that one forms a belief in a particular proposition in 
order to form a belief about or as to whether that proposition is true, the above schema 
for hypothetical instrumental reasons (HI) is structurally identical to schema (T) 
describing the relationship between epistemic reasons to believe that p, reasons to 
form beliefs about p, and whether one ought to believe that p. Both schemas state a 
conditional relationship between the obtainment of a certain kind of reason and the 
truth of another conditional, moving from the obtainment of a different kind of reason 
to an ought-statement. Furthermore, in both schemas, the normative force of the 
consequent ought-statement is carried over from the reason in the embedded 
conditional, and the content of what one ought to do is carried over from the reason 
on the left hand side of the overall conditional. This structural identity suggests that 
one possible explanation of the relationship outlined in Section 4 is that epistemic 
reasons are simply special cases of what we have called ‘hypothetical instrumental 
reasons’. To be precise, they are instrumental reasons for believing particular 
propositions in pursuit of the hypothetical (i.e. present or non-present) aim of forming 
beliefs about those propositions. It is this fact that explains the special relationship 
between epistemic reasons, reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions, and 
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ought-statements, explicated in the previous section. This claim obviously stands in 
need of further clarification. A helpful way of doing so will be to test it against a 
number of objections.  
 
6. Objections 
The perhaps most influential objection to standard instrumentalist accounts of 
epistemic reasons, is that it would make epistemic reasons hypothetical in a sense 
they are clearly not. As mentioned in the previous, on the standard version of the 
instrumentalist account, epistemic reasons depend on the contingent aims of the 
believer. In an influential discussion, Kelly has pointed out that epistemic reasons are 
not hypothetical in that sense. Most importantly, epistemic reasons are usually 
considered to be intersubjective in a way that they could not be if they depended on 
the particular aims of agents. When we offer evidence to someone, we take the 
evidence to provide epistemic reason for that person to believe a particular 
proposition, regardless of whether she happens to have the relevant cognitive goal 
(Kelly 2003, 621).  
The present account avoids this objection in two distinct ways. First of all, it 
does not make what one ought to believe depend on the aims or desires of agents, but 
rather on the reasons agents have to form beliefs about certain propositions or subject 
matters. As mentioned above, it seems that such reasons are value-based in a 
relatively straightforward sense: whether one has reason to form beliefs about some 
subject matter depends on the value of doing so. I have left it open whether such 
reasons might be categorical in certain instances, but there is no principled reason 
why they couldn’t be on the present account. Secondly, on the proposed account 
epistemic reasons are not hypothetical in the problematic sense that Kelly has in mind. 
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Whether someone has epistemic reason to believe a particular proposition depends on 
the evidence available concerning the truth of that proposition. As such, epistemic 
reasons are intersubjective – providing evidence to someone is equivalent to 
providing that person with an epistemic reason, regardless of the particular aims and 
desires of that person. Epistemic reasons are hypothetical only in the sense that 
whether one ought to form a belief in accordance with them depends on an additional 
factor, namely whether one has reason to form beliefs about the relevant propositions 
in the first place. And it is fully compatible with the present account that these 
additional reasons might be categorical. 
Another possible objection is that the present proposal downplays the 
normative significance of epistemic reasons to an implausible extent. The proposal 
would in effect assimilate epistemic reasons to the infinite number of conditional 
statements about instrumental reasons that are true of us all the time. For example, 
whether or not I have reason to go to London, it is true of me right now that if I have 
all things considered reason to go to London, then I ought to go to the airport. This 
conditional truth follows from the fact that going to the airport is necessary in order 
for me to go to London. Countless other such conditional statements are true of me at 
all times. It is true of me that if I have reason to call my mother, then I ought to turn 
on my phone, and so on ad infinitum. Can it really be true that epistemic reasons are 
as normatively insignificant as that? 
But setting it up this way makes the situation seem worse than it really is. Two 
considerations should make it appear decidedly more palatable. First of all, if I did 
have a reason to go to London, it would be normatively significant that a necessary 
step for me to do so is to head out to the airport. The same goes for epistemic reasons, 
and we do have reason to form beliefs about a rather large number of propositions and 
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subject matters. So very often, it is of normative significance to be such that if one has 
reason to form beliefs about some proposition, then one ought to believe that 
proposition. Secondly, it does seem true that we have much more evidence available 
than we have reason to respond to by forming the appropriate beliefs. If epistemic 
reasons are generated by evidence available to us, we have a large, perhaps infinite, 
number of epistemic reasons all the time, and far from all of them are about matters 
worth forming beliefs about. It would be absurd for an account of epistemic reasons to 
entail that we are at fault for failing to respond to all those epistemic reasons, so any 
account of epistemic reasons must be able to explain why we are quite justified in not 
caring about the vast majority of them. The proposed account does just that, by 
making the normative import of epistemic reasons depend in a systematic way on a 
different kind of value based reasons. 
In this way, the account may also help to resolve a current dispute over the 
normative status of evidence. In his original criticism of instrumentalism about 
epistemic reasons, Kelly (2003) argued that the instrumentalist cannot explain how 
we can have epistemic reasons for believing propositions that we have neither reason 
nor desire to form beliefs about, such as propositions about the ending of a movie we 
are about to watch. Adam Leite (2007) has objected to this that we ought to 
distinguish between having epistemic reason to believe some proposition, and having 
evidence suggesting that proposition to be true. While having an epistemic reason is a 
normative property of some person, having evidence is a purely descriptive property. 
So having evidence doesn’t necessarily imply having an epistemic reason. But in his 
reply to Leite, Kelly (2007) argues that there is no clear non-normative sense of 
evidence.21 As the argument goes, evidence cannot be understood save as something 
                                                
21 Kelly attributes this point to Jaegwon Kim (1988). 
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that makes a difference to what one is justified in believing. Kelly even suggests that 
‘evidence’ might be more or less synonymous with ‘reason to believe’, at least as long 
as this latter term is understood in the epistemic sense (2006). If that is correct, the 
instrumentalist cannot rely on a sharp distinction between those two terms in 
answering Kelly’s initial challenge, as Leite has suggested. It seems, however, that 
the account proposed here can accommodate the intuition that evidence must be 
understood normative terms, and even that ‘evidence’ is synonymous with ‘epistemic 
reason’, without thereby committing to the view that having evidence requires that 
one form a belief in accordance with it. For suppose that we accept the equivalence 
between having evidence and having an epistemic reason. On the current account, 
none of these terms would then be understandable in non-normative terms, since they 
(necessarily) entail a conditional statement about what one ought to believe. But since 
the ‘ought’ in question is embedded in a conditional, Kelly’s initial challenge is 
avoided. The embedded conditional can be true without the consequent ought-
statement of that conditional being true. One can thus have evidence, and therefore 
epistemic reason to believe some proposition, without it being the case that one ought 
to form a belief in that proposition, as in Kelly’s problematic movie case. 
A further possible objection is that the account fails to explain why one can be 
rationally unassailable in holding an evidentially supported belief in a proposition that 
one has no reason to have or form beliefs about in the first place. It seems, for 
example, that even if I have no reason to have or form a belief about the ending of the 
movie I am about to watch (even, in fact, if I have all things considered reason not to), 
if I inadvertently were to acquire evidence about the ending and form a belief 
accordingly, that belief would be rationally unassailable. The most plausible answer 
to this objection, I think, is to point out that even if the belief in question is 
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unassailable in the sense that the believer cannot be blamed for having formed it, the 
belief is nonetheless regrettable. It is regrettable for someone to form a belief about 
the ending of a movie he or she is about to watch, especially if the enjoyment of the 
movie depends partly on not knowing how it ends. This point seems to generalise to 
all beliefs that we have reason not to form. We routinely withhold evidence from 
people because we judge that they have reason not to form the belief in question, and 
this seems a perfectly justifiable practice. So if the beliefs in question are ‘rationally 
unassailable’, this must be in a specific sense rather than tout court. But if that is the 
case, the present account can explain the rational unassailability of such beliefs in a 
perfectly straightforward way. On the present account, if S has epistemic reason to 
believe that p, S is such that, if she has all things considered reason to form beliefs 
about p, S ought to believe that p. A belief can thus be rationally unassailable for S 
from an epistemic point of view (supported by epistemic reason, that is), without S 
being such that she ought to believe that p.  
 
7. Conclusion 
I have proposed that epistemic reasons be regarded as a species of what I called 
hypothetical instrumental reasons. The arguments came in two stages. First it was 
argued that, necessarily, if S has epistemic reason to believe that p, then S is such that 
if she has all things considered reason to form beliefs about p, S ought to believe that 
p. It was then argued that this relationship between epistemic reasons, reasons to form 
beliefs about certain propositions, and normative statements about what a person 
ought to believe, could be explained by supposing that epistemic reasons are 
hypothetical instrumental reasons. The main virtue of this account is that it provides a 
sense in which epistemic reasons are teleological, or value based, without 
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commitment to epistemic properties being valuable in a general sense, or to there 
being a sense in which every epistemically well-founded belief is valuable. In this 
way, the account avoids the perhaps most pertinent problem faced by teleological 
accounts in recent years, namely what I termed the ‘value problem’. Furthermore, the 
account avoids problems typically associated with purely instrumentalist variants of 
the teleological account, since it avoids making epistemic reasons aim or desire 
dependent, while at the same time explaining why epistemic reasons do not in 
themselves require that a belief be formed. Needless to say, the account must be 
clarified and developed further before its merits can be assessed fully. But I hope to 
have shown that the teleological account may be more resilient than is often 
supposed.22 
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